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The past two decades have been characterised by an increasing uncoupling 
of economic growth and social and economic development. Outside of China, 
the numbers living in absolute poverty have remained stubbornly large; in 
Africa, they have increased substantially. Although this uncoupling has 
multiple sources, the trajectory of innovation (large in scale, capital intensive 
in nature and destructive of the environment) has contributed to these 
outcomes. Reorienting towards a more ‘inclusive innovation’ path has an 
important role to play in overcoming exclusion. However, we have only a 
weak understanding of the definition, nature and dynamics of inclusive 
innovation and this paper seeks to fill this conceptual gap. It argues that 
inclusive innovation needs to be understood and developed in the context of a  
holistic conception of the innovation cycle, the distinction between process 
and product innovation and the roles played by the poor as both producers 
and consumer. It further charts the growing interest of private sector actors in 
inclusive innovation (including, but not confined to TNCs seeking the “fortune 
at the bottom of the pyramid”) and large global funds working in tandem with 
the private sector and governments. Consideration is also given to the role 
which growth trajectories play in determining the direction of innovation and in 
promoting linkages between the globally absolute poor (incomes below $1pd) 
and those with discretionary cash incomes living in the margins above $1pd. 
The paper concludes with a call for a more holistic and balanced approach to 
inclusive innovation to be adopted by a range of stakeholders so that 
resources are deployed most effectively to aid the recoupling of growth and 
development. 
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The unfolding of the global financial crisis after 2008 has sharpened the focus 
of policy discussion on the interrelationship between growth, absolute poverty 
and inequality. One of the most striking developments has been the 
uncoupling of economic growth from the incomes of the global absolute poor. 
As can be seen from Table 1, associated with the rapid growth of the global 
economy (and particularly China) over the past two decades, the numbers 
living globally below the Millennium Development Goal $1.25pd absolute 
poverty benchmark (hereafter referred to as $1pd, or MDG1) fell by 339m 
between 1988-1990 and 2007-2008. This is often taken to indicate progress in 
global poverty reduction. Yet, the decline in the poverty number in China 
(516m) exceeded the reduction in the global total (339m). This means that 
outside of China, the number living globally below MDG1 increased by 177m. 
Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) witnessed a more than doubling of its growth over 
the two decades, and during the 2000s, its growth was almost 50% higher 
than the global average. Yet, between 1990 and 2008 the number living below 
MDG1 increased by 59%. In India, the recent growth miracle has been 
associated with a further 42m people living below MDG1. Strikingly, despite 
rapid economic growth, there was a more than doubling of the number of the 
absolutely poor in middle income countries and currently, more than 70% of 
those living below MDG1 live in this rapidly growing group of economies 
(Sumner, 2010) 
 
Table 1: GDP Growth Rates and Numbers Living Below MDG1, 1990-2008 
 
 GDP growth p.a (%) Living below $1.25 per 
day (MDG1) 
($2005PPP) 
  1990-2000 2000-2008 1988-90 2007-2008 
World 2.9 3.1 1,668 1,329 
China 9.9 10.4 724 208 
India 5.5 7.0 414 456 
SSA 2.2 4.9 224 355 
Source: Poverty numbers from Chen and Ravallion (2008) and Sumner 
(2010). Growth rates from WDI, accessed October 2011 
 
These developments in growth, absolute poverty and inequality highlight the 
structural character of the dominant growth model in which, in many countries, 
a significant proportion of the population have been and are excluded from the 
fruits of growth. This exclusion takes two forms. At the one pole are those with 
gainful employment or access to land but who have witnessed static, highly 
variable or declining real incomes or incomes growing less rapidly than fellow 
citizens at the higher levels of income. At the other pole are those who are 
wholly outside of income generating activities – the unemployed and the 
landless. 
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One of the primary factors which explains why enhanced growth co-exists 
with, and indeed in some cases causes an increase in both absolute and 
relative poverty is  the dominant trajectory of innovation.1 Its capital-intensive 
nature, its scale intensity, its dependence on high-quality networked 
infrastructure, its reliance on skilled labour and its product portfolio (producing 
products which meet the needs of the rich) all have the effect of 
disadvantaging the poor, both as consumers and producers, It also excludes 
large segments of the population in many countries from productive 
employment. Moreover, much contemporary technology is also destructive of 
the environment, not least in relation to its energy-intensity, and this has 
disproportionately harmful impacts on the global poor.2 Whilst innovation is 
only a partial contributor to the persistence of global poverty it is an important 
one, and one which is largely neglected in the theorisation of innovation 
(Cozzens and Kaplinsky, 2009; Lorentzen, 2010).  
 
In earlier papers (Chataway, Smith and Wield, 2006; Kaplinsky et al., 2009, 
Kaplinsky, 2013; Cozzens and Kaplinsky, 2009) we have sought to explain 
the dynamics of innovation which have in the past led to a predominantly 
exclusionary innovation trajectory. This drew on the theory of induced 
innovation (factor prices, the nature of demand and the quality and nature of 
infrastructure), institutional economics (path dependency amongst innovation 
firms) and the concentration of innovative capabilities (including, but not 
confined to R&D) in high income markets. In this paper, we turn our attention 
to the other side of the innovation-poverty coin. We argue that as a 
consequence of the growing global dispersion of technological capabilities, 
and of vibrant entrepreneurship and rapidly growing markets in the south, 
there is an increasingly market and consumer-driven momentum towards new 
trajectories of innovation. In some cases  these new trajectories are producing 
more inclusive innovations. But if economic growth and development are to be 
recoupled, there is an acute need to speed up and strengthen this still 
incipient trend. Therefore in this paper we shift the focus of discussion from 
the determinants of exclusionary innovation to the factors determining the 
development of a more inclusionary innovative trajectory.  
 
In the context of the developmental crisis of the dominant growth model, there 
is burgeoning interest by a variety of parties in the inclusive innovation 
agenda. However, most of the policy prescriptions are partial – addressing 
particular products (for example, renewable energy), particular constituencies 
(for example, excluded women) and particular actors (for example, 
transnational corporations or civil society organisations). Although each of 
these specific innovation agendas can point to distinctive policy implications 
and successful outcomes, what is patently missing is a systemic overview of 
the multifaceted character of inclusive innovation. Without such a synthetic 
overview it is difficult to assess the significance of new trajectories of inclusive 
innovation, to direct scarce resources in the most efficient way, to maximise 
                                            
1
  Two other primary causal factors are the deepening of the globalisation of value 
chains and the growing financialisation of the global economy (Kaplinsky, 2013) 
2
  Paraphrasing Schumpeter, Luc Soete graphically refers to this as “gales of 
destructive creation” 
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synergies arising from the actions of different actors and to draw on the 
energies of a wide range of potential innovators.  
 
In Section 2 we chart the origins of concerns with inclusive innovation. Section 
3 identifies the importance of the innovation cycle, distinguishing between the 
differences between and characteristics of product and process innovation. 
Section 4 explores the role played by the poor as producers, innovators and 
consumers of innovation, and in Section 5 we explore the synergies between 
innovation which reaches the very poorest and the not so very poorest of the 
global population. Section 6 addresses three major constraints to inclusive 
innovation and this is followed in Section 7 with a discussion of the major 
potential drivers of inclusive innovation. Section 8 concludes by briefly 
summarising the argument and addressing the need for policies designed to 
speed up and deepen the drive to more inclusive forms of innovation, 
 
2: PAST AND RECENT INITIATIVES TO PROMOTE INCLUSIVE 
INNOVATION 
 
Much of the recent literature on inclusive innovation suggests that this is a 
new agenda. But in reality a concern with the equity outcomes of innovation 
goes back at least to the 1950s. It is possible to identify four major strands of 
analysis in this emerging focus on inclusive innovation – the impact of growth 
paths on innovation and inclusion; the dynamic of not-for-profit and 
community-based “innovation from below”; the Schumpeterian motor and 
profit seeking innovation, which we term “innovation from above”; and the call 
for innovations in public goods, including those involving public private 
partnerships. There are of course overlaps between these four strands of 
thinking and in some cases the implications for inclusive innovation are an 
implicit rather than an explicit focus of enquiry. Beyond these analytical roots, 
inclusive innovation is also rapidly entering the policy domain. 
 
Growth paths and inclusive innovation 
We are accustomed to think of “innovation” in terms of major breakthroughs 
such as microelectronics and nanotechnology which build on complex and 
knowledge intensive processes of structured research and development. 
However, in reality, the overwhelming character of innovation is that it is 
incremental in nature and often results from “below the radar” processes of 
fiddling and adjustment to existing technologies (Hollander, 1965; Katz and 
Shapiro 1987). Reflecting this process of “neighbouring-innovations”, the 
evolutionary economics literature (Dosi, 1982; Nelson and Winter, 1982) has 
tended to focus on these trajectories within firms, and the global value chains 
literature on the innovation path dependency of chains of firms (addressed as 
an issue of upgrading – Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001).  
 
However, another pattern of path dependency in innovation is that which 
reflects sectors rather than firms. The Soviet industrialisation debate of the 
1920s, consciously mirrored in debates around India’s and China’s 
development strategies in the 1950s, posed the choice between specialisation 
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in the more capital intensive “Department 1” capital goods heavy industries 
and the more labour intensive “Department 2” light industries producing 
consumer goods. In the context of the incremental nature of technological 
change, each of these growth paths will have major implications for the 
direction of innovation and patterns of exclusion. In general, the labour 
intensive “Department 2” trajectories adopted in China tended to involve the 
development of technologies which reinforced more dispersed patterns of 
industrialisation and a more intensive use of labour than those innovations 
arising from a the focus on heavy industrialisation in the Soviet Union after the 
late 1920s and in India until the 1990s. Similar choices, with derived 
implications for innovation, occurred in relation to the strategic orientation of 
the agricultural sector. One of the factors often used to explain the differential 
growth experiences of east Asia and Latin America is that the Asian model 
relied more heavily on small scale relatively un-mechanised agriculture and its 
associated innovations, and was therefore more inclusive by nature than the 
Latin American model (Wade, 1990). 
 
There have been associated debates about the consequences for innovation 
when countries specialise in capital and scale intensive extractive industries 
such as base metals and oil and gas. Unlike agricultural soft commodities 
which lend themselves to a choice of technology – in relation to scale- and 
factor-intensity, and environmental footprint – the extractive industries involve 
technologies which are often more rigid and by being more scale- and capital-
intensive, consolidate patterns of excluding innovation. For example, the 
South Africa economy has long been characterised by particularly high levels 
of unemployment and exclusion. This, it is argued, arose through a 
combination of an agricultural sector dominated by large scale capital 
intensive farms (Wilson, 1985) and a mining-industry specialisation which has 
come to be termed a “minerals-energy complex” (Fine and Rustomjee, 1996), 
each with an associated patterns of innovation. 
 
The upshot of these literatures and their derived policy discussions is that the 
choice of growth-path has major implications for economic specialisation. In 
turn, this specialisation contributes heavily to clustered patterns of 
technological choice. Moreover, as a consequence of the incremental and 
path-dependent nature of much innovation and the alignment of National 
Systems of Innovation institutions to economic structures, the choice of 
development path at a broad strategic level arises as a major policy agenda 
affecting the inclusive character of innovation. 
 
Innovation from below and the rise of the AT movement 
In early 19th Century England, Robert Owen sought to develop an alternative 
to the large “satanic mills” which dominated the cotton textile industry, and to 
organise his mills in ways which empowered the workforce and which 
supported smaller communities (ranging in size between 500 and 3,000 
people). More recently, and with a much greater contemporary impact, 
Ghandi championed the development and use of small scale labour intensive 
technologies with his concept of “sarvodayo” appropriate technologies. He 
argued that the replication of the Soviet growth-path would reinforce, massive 
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processes of exclusion and sought to promote the choice and development of 
technologies which were more labour-intensive and small-scale. 
 
Ghandi’s ideas were developed by Schumacher whose widely cited work 
“Small is Beautiful” (Schumacher, 1973) had practical outcomes with the birth 
of the Intermediate Technology Development Group (ITDG) in 1965, 
Appropriate Technology International in the USA and similar groups 
elsewhere, It also led to a flourishing literature focusing Appropriate 
Technology (Jequier, Carr, McRobey, Kaplinsky, etc). The early challenge of 
the AT movement was to develop (”invent”) more inclusive technologies, but 
over time it also became concerned with the deployment (“innovation”) of 
these inventions, recognising that innovation took both embodied and 
disembodied forms. In more recent years the mantle of the bottom-up 
innovation of ATs has been assumed by the global grassroots movement 
(Smith, Fressoli and Thomas, 2013), heavily influenced by the community-
innovation based Honeybee Network in India (Gupta et al, 2003; http://steps-
centre.org/project/grassroots/). 
 
Reflecting the spirit of the period in which Schumacher wrote, the widely-cited 
Sussex Manifesto (SM) of 1970 focused on the nature and trajectory of 
Research and Development (Singer et al, 1970). The Sussex Manifesto 
pointed to the overwhelming concentration of R&D in high income economies 
(estimated at 98% in 1970), and the mirroring trajectory of that part of global 
R&D which occurred in low income economies. The result of this bias in the 
innovation system, which reflected the inducements to technological change 
in high income economies, was the development of technologies which were 
inappropriate to the needs of the poor. In keeping with the outcome of the SM, 
the ILO’s World Employment Programme in the 1970s led to a series of high-
profile country employment reports on Colombia, Sri Lanka and Kenya, each 
of which flagged the inappropriateness of innovation as an important 
contributor to the exclusion of the poor from production processes. The ILO’s 
programme was complemented by a series of academic studies on the choice 
of technology, again highlighting the inappropriateness of innovation 
trajectories for the poor (Sen, 1962; Bhalla 1974 and 1985; Stewart, 1979) 
and seeking to promote the development of more inclusive innovations, 
including those which had implications for the informal sector and for the 
wider incorporation of women in production. This body of analysis thus 
simultaneously addressed the macro concerns of the growth-path literature 
and the microeconomic, firm-level focus of the AT practitioners.  
 
Innovation from above and the Schumpeterian motor 
The proponents of appropriate technology and community-based innovation 
can loosely be described as reflecting the drive for “innovation from below”, 
often undertaken by, or with the active participation of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). By contrast, and of much more recent origin, is the 
recognition of the role which market-driven and profit-oriented enterprises 
(including those firms with a global reach) can play in the development of 
inclusive innovation.  We refer to this phenomenon as “innovation from 
above”.  
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A significant development in the latter part of the 1990s and in the first decade 
of the 21st Century was the growing interest of the large scale private sector in 
pro-poor innovation. The seminal contribution was made by Prahalad 
(Prahalad and Hammond, 2002; Prahalad, 2005). Arguing the case for 
“inclusive capitalism”, he pointed to the market opportunities open to large 
firms as a consequence of the rapid rise in incomes at “the bottom of the 
pyramid (BOP)”. An important development of Prahalad’s clarion call was the 
idea of “reverse innovation” promoted by the CEO of General Electric, 
America’s largest industrial corporation (Immelt et al, 2009). Stimulated by 
sustained high growth in China and India, in contrast to the slowing of growth 
in much of the OECD economies, Immelt pointed to a redirection of GE’s 
innovation, from a previous trajectory of innovating-down from high income to 
low income markets to one of innovating-up from low income to high income 
markets. The momentum towards reverse innovation is now strong in the 
transnational corporation sector and a number of the world’s largest 
corporations such as Proctor and Gamble, Unilever, Nestles and Philips are 
all seeking the exploit the market opportunities opened by the growth of low 
income consumer markets in the south. It is a momentum not confined to the 
producers of fast moving consumer goods but it also evident in a range of 
other sectors such as mobile telecommunications, medical imaging, and 
tractors and power tillers for the agricultural sector. 
 
Whilst BOP innovation has its primary roots in northern based TNCs, an 
associated development has been the rise of interest in what has come to be 
called “frugal innovation” or Jugaad Innovation (Radiou, Prabhu and Ahuja, 
2012). The term “frugal innovation” originated in India and refers to systematic 
attempts made to cut out the luxury and “unnecessary” features of products 
developed for high income markets. Thus, by applying these principles, Tata 
in India was able to  develop a car selling for less than $2,500.  
 
But these large firms - whether they be of southern or northern origin – are not 
the only capitalist profit-seeking enterprises producing more inclusive 
innovations. There is a largely undocumented process whereby small and 
medium sized firms, often located in the rural areas and smaller industrial 
cities and towns in large southern economies, are involved in “below the radar 
innovation”. Exploiting local markets and using locally available resources, 
they introduce new products more accessible to the poor and utilise new 
technologies which are more inclusive of poor producers. Indeed, some 
innovation scholars question whether in practice inclusive innovation is more 
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Public goods and public-private partnerships 
The “innovation from above” market-oriented and profit-seeking innovations 
depend on developed and well-functioning markets which not only facilitate 
efficient information flows between producers and users, but also allow 
innovators to appropriate the fruits of their investments in developing and 
introducing new technologies. But some markets are unable to support these 
processes of appropriation, because of the non-exhaustability of the products, 
because of spillovers of benefits from one set of paying users to another set 
of non-paying users, because of the difficulty of legally defining and then 
enforcing property rights, or simply because the targeted consumers lack the 
income required to buy the product. In these cases (Kale et al, 2013), there 
has been a growing drive towards public-private partnerships in which private 
sector actors combine with charitable foundations and/or governments to 
promote the development and adoption of more inclusive innovations. For 
example, the rapid deployment of insecticide-impregnated bednets helping to 
prevent malaria involves a combination of such actors. Similarly, global 
foundations such as Gates and Rockefeller have combined with the private 
sector to develop drugs which are relevant to the needs of very poor 
consumers who lack purchasing power, and infectious illnesses characterised 
by classic public health concerns, such as HIV retroviral drugs (Chataway and 
Smith, 2006).  
 
The policy domain is rapidly gathering momentum 
As we observed in the Introduction, the growing recognition that there has 
been an uncoupling of growth and poverty eradication has led to awareness 
of the role which inclusive innovation may play in generating different 
outcomes. In an edited volume published on inclusive innovation in India in 
2007, the World Bank first used the term “inclusive innovation”, defining it as 
“knowledge creation and absorption efforts that are most relevant to the 
needs of the poor” (Dutz, 2007: xv).3  The contribution by Utz and Dahlman 
recognised the key contribution of bottom up grassroots innovation to the 
wider objective of inclusive innovation (Dutz and Dahlman, 2007). 
Subsequently, at a World Bank funded Forum on Inclusive Innovation held in 
Beijing in June 2012 
(http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2012/06/21/beijing-forum-
promotes-inclusive-innovation-for-sustainable-growth) an emphasis was put 
on case study examples that highlighted mechanisms to support the 
development of partnerships and grassroots innovation. Kuznetsov, a senior 
economist at the Bank, promoted the case for inclusive innovation in inclusive 
growth strategies, and argued that innovation which was not new to the world 
but which reflected local circumstances was an important component of 
inclusive innovation (Kuznetsov, 2011). 
 
The UNDP funded International Policy Center for Inclusive Growth based in 
Brazil argued that inclusive growth is not just about outcomes (everyone 
                                            
3
  Innovation scholars would take exception to this definition, however, since it refers to 
the growth of capabilities rather than to the development and diffusion of inclusive 
innovations. 
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shares in the results of growth) but also has derived implications for 
processes (everyone is given opportunity to participate in growth process) and 
hence for innovation. Bilateral aid agencies such as The UK’s Department for 
International Development have also targeted inclusive innovation, but 
generally as sub-components of individual aid initiatives programmes (for 
example, health and private sector development) rather than as a 
comprehensive, integrated and “joined-up” innovation programme. It is 
significant that whereas inclusive growth has become an increasingly 
prominent concern for some research  funding bodies (for example, in the 
UK), the specific issue of inclusive innovation has largely been ignored, save 
for a short-lived research window opened by the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) on inclusive innovation in the informal sector and 
with a gender focus.  
  
 
3. TECHNOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE INNOVATION 
CYCLE 
 
In Section 1 above we pointed to the growing disjuncture between growth and 
poverty eradication and pointed to the potential role which inclusive innovation 
can play in generating a more developmentally positive set of growth 
outcomes. This was followed in Section 2 by a review of the roots to the 
burgeoning interest in inclusive innovation and a growing interest amongst 
policy makers in the potential which inclusive innovation has to promote less 
excluding patterns of growth.  
 
What emerges from this review is that inclusive innovation is a weakly defined 
area of enquiry, with multiple roots and little synthetic analysis. There is a 
lacuna of robust data to support the development of an evidence-based policy 
agenda and each of the different sets of stakeholders’ involvement in inclusive 
innovation reflects a particular set of interests, often promoted with 
considerable hype. Consequently there are few, if any, guidelines to allow 
policymakers (in both the public and private sectors) to weigh up alternative 
types of inclusive innovation, and to develop a division of labour which allows 
for an effective innovation-response to the challenges posed by excluding 
growth processes. The function of the analysis which follows is to provide an 
architectural framework in which the different components of inclusive 
innovation can be assessed.  
 
The innovation cycle within the innovation system 
Beginning at the highest level of abstraction, specific innovations need to be 
set within the context of the innovation cycle which, in turn, is embedded in 
the innovation system. This is the first element of our inclusive innovation 
policy framework.  
 
The innovation system refers to the ensemble of actors who are directly and 
indirectly engaged in the process of innovation. At its centre is the recognition 
that whilst innovation may surface as the (generally appropriated) output of a 
particular actor (usually the firm), in reality it emerges from the 
interrelationship between different actors in the system of innovation. The 
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range of actors involved in innovation will necessarily vary over time and 
between sectors and countries. But it will generally be drawn from the private 
sector (the core innovating unit and its suppliers and customers), state owned 
institutions responsible for the development of new products and services, 
research and technology organisations (RTOs) and the educational system. 
The character of the innovations so produced will reflect the tacit and codified 
routines which characterise each of these core actors’ organisation and the 
standards and regulations which are defined by external bodies and which 
affect the parameters of the products and processes which emerge. As will 
become clear in later discussion, the trajectory of the individual components 
and the ensemble of actors in the innovation system will have an important 
bearing on the inclusivity of the innovations which are produced. 
 
The Innovation Cycle refers to the stages involved in the development and 
diffusion of a specific innovation and consists of six broad sets of activities 
(Figure 1). All products – whether they be goods or services – need to be 
envisioned, that is, conceived. This conception will require some level of 
development which may be simple (such as water bottle lights)4 or involve 
considerable inputs of basic science and technological development (for 
example, in the development of malaria vaccines). Beyond development lies 
the production of the envisioned good or service. But these outputs need to 
be delivered to the market and as in the case of development and production, 
this might be a simple process (low cost wooden furniture sold on the 
roadside) or very complex in nature (embedding malaria bednets in a 
comprehensive health-care delivery system). Often, particularly in the case of 
non-traditional products, there will also be a technological component in use. 
Increasingly, too, it is important to consider the recycling stage of the 
innovation cycle, both because recycling can be an important source of 
income for the poor and because the poor are often victims to environmental 
damage in production and consumption. Each of the components of the 
innovation cycle, and the interaction between them, poses challenges for 
inclusive innovation and lend themselves to specific interventions likely to 
promote more inclusive forms of innovation. 
 
One of the important lessons to be learned from the innovation literature is 
that this cycle is not necessarily sequential and does not necessarily begin 
with conception. 5  Thus Figure 2 only seeks to identify the major sets of 
functions in the innovation cycle, each of which requires attention in the 
development of a holistic approach towards inclusive innovation.  
 
 
                                            
4
 http://uk.reuters.com/video/2011/07/11/bringing-light-to-the-poor-one-liter-at?videoId=216968892  
5
  These are prime concerns in the literature documenting the sift from Mode 1 to Mode 
2 innovation systems (Gibbons et al, 1994; Clark, 2009) 
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At a step down in the level of abstraction, a distinction can be made between 
two key components of technological change in the innovation cycle – 
changes in product and changes in process. Products are an important realm 
of pro-poor innovation since they may be appropriate or inappropriate to the 
needs of the poor. Here, as Figure 2 shows, there is an important distinction 
between physical products and services. In each case these outputs can be 
decomposed into capital goods (the machinery and services which allow 
production to occur), intermediate goods (inputs into the production process) 
and consumer goods and services (products for final use). In turn, consumers 
goods (but not services) may either be single-use or durable, that is they can 
be used and reused. By their nature, capital goods are durable, and 
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Within process innovation (Figure 3) we can distinguish embodied physical 
technology from disembodied organisational technology. The former is 
reflected in equipment and physical inputs, the latter in the way in which these 
inputs are combined. Disembodied technologies are more complex in the 
sense that innovation can occur within a particular institution, in the division of 
labour and coordination between different links in the chain, and in positioning 
in different links in the chain (“functional upgrading” in the GVC framework – 
Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). This “slicing up” of the value chain has 
particularly important pro-poor implications in low and middle income 
economies since the separating-out of the unskilled and semi-skilled 
components of work has led to massive employment creation in some 
countries, notably in China, but also in Central America and some other 
developing economies. (On the other hand, it has simultaneously had 
excluding characteristics through the hollowing out of industrial sectors and 
the displacement of unskilled and semi-skilled labour in some high income 
economies). It has also had important gender-distributional implications since 
much of this relocated labour has involved women who formerly had little 
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4. PRODUCTION BY AND PRODUCTION FOR THE POOR 
 
Ultimately, poverty is a reflection of consumption power. However, because 
there are a range of complex transfers in economies (for example, between 
individuals, within families and communities, between regions, and through 
taxation and social expenditure, from governments) the power of the poor to 
consume products may only be loosely linked to the participation of the poor 
in processes of production. This has important implications for innovation 
which, to meet the needs of the poor, needs to take account both of the types 
of products which are produced, and the role played by the poor in production 
and hence in their capacity to earn the incomes which facilitate consumption. 
It is thus important to distinguish the poor as consumers from the poor as 
producers, and the links between consumption and production. 
 
The poor as consumers 
The archetypical consumer in mainstream economic theory is the individual, 
seeking to maximise his/her economic welfare. Although mainstream 
economics is now beginning to recognise that individuals are capable of 
altruistic behaviour,6 it is still largely wedded to the idea of the consumer as 
an individual. Implicit in this conception of the individual as a consumer is the 
capacity which individuals have to purchase goods and services. This may be 
a realistic assumption in high income economies (where in many cases, 
                                            
6
  Amusingly, students of economics were less prone to engage in altruistic behaviour 




















Division of labour and tiers of suppliers 
and users 
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children have disposable incomes above the MDG1 $1pd target), but it is 
patently not the case with regard to the global poor. Typically, to the extent 
that this group of consumers purchased goods and services, this will be a 
household purchase (for example, a single mobile phone rather than a phone 
for every member of the family), a purchase between households (extended 
families or neighbours sharing products) and in some cases purchases by 
villages or community organisations for communal consumption. Clearly, the 
more inclusive innovations reduce the acquisition cost of products, the more 
likely  consumption decisions will be made at the individual or household 
level. 
 
Beyond the identity of the consuming unit, inclusive innovation will necessarily 
need to reflect the demand characteristics of poor consumers. Figure 4 
presents nine different product characteristics which may reflect consumer 
incomes. These are whether the product is for single use or repeated use; the 
acquisition cost of the product; its longevity (quality as long-life); costs of 
maintenance (quality as extent of repairs); the operating costs; the brand 
image provided to the consumer; the impact on the environment; and the 
extent to which the product embodies characteristics which reflects 
environmental and ethical considerations.  
 
These product characteristics may be interlinked. For example, products with 
a low acquisition cost and which are affordable to the poor may have high 
maintenance costs, may not be recyclable, may embody few ethical standards 
and convey an image of poverty rather than exclusivity. These products would 
typically be products appropriate for poor consumers. At the other end of the 
spectrum, products which have very high acquisition costs and which reflect a 
variety of ethical and environmental standards may have low maintenance 
and repair costs and are typically the sorts of products consumed by the very 
rich. 
 
The innovation literature in high income countries has paid increasing 
attention to the role played by consumers in not just shaping but participating 
in innovation processes (notably the work of von Hippel, 1976; 2005). There 
has been no equivalent focus on the role played by consumers in innovation 
in low and middle income economies, and indeed, the overwhelming 
character of innovation in these economies is that it is “supply-pushed” rather 
than demand-pulled (Hall et al, 2007). One of the reasons for this exclusion of 
consumers is the considerable gap which exists in our understanding of the 
nature of demand patterns in these economies. The sophisticated marketing 
exercises undertaken by the private sector in developed country contexts - for 
example, discrete choice experiments, behavioural economics techniques and 
future scenario analysis (de Bekker-Grob et al, 2010; Train, 2003) -  are 
generally not mirrored in developing country contexts. Where they are utilised 
they are seldom directed to understanding the consumption patterns of the 
very poor.  
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The poor as producers 
With respect to the income characteristics of producers, there are a number of 
important issues to be considered (Figure 5). The first relates to the character 
of ownership. Are those involved in production in any way equity holders in 
the venture – perhaps through ownership of land, or equipment or equity? 
Second, what is the nature of this ownership (individual, collective or 
corporate)? Third, does the character of the productive asset affect the 
capacity of the poor to be involved in ownership – for example, capital 
intensive or minimum scale of production may preclude the poor from 
ownership. Fourth, how does the character of the productive asset affect the 
capacity of the poor to be involved in production – for example, is it labour 
intensive; does it require large scale production which precludes decentralised 
operating units? Fifth, arising from the pattern of work which is generated in 
production, what is the nature of the skills involved? Is the workforce 
unskilled, semi-skilled or highly-skilled? As a general rule, inclusive innovation 
will involve the generation of processes which lend themselves to ownership 
by small-scale or collective producers, use relatively labour-intensive 

















The poor consumer 
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Figure 5: Poor producers 
 
Putting together the two sets of characteristics  (the poor as producers and as 
consumers), it is possible to identify a generalised schema to assess the 
relevance of innovation to inclusive growth (Figure 6). The top left quadrant 
represents innovations which involve the poor as both producers and as 
consumers. In low income countries this might involve informal sector 
furniture manufactures, or small scale farmers producing vegetables for local 
markets. The top right hand quadrant is where poor producers produce 
products for high income consumers. They may be employed as workers in 
Foxxcom factories assembling iPhones in China, or small scale farmers in 
Kenya producing flowers and vegetables for European markets. The bottom 
left hand represents the efforts of TNCs to produce products for “the bottom of 
the pyramid” markets in the personal hygiene and pharma sectors. Finally, the 
bottom right hand quadrant represents cases where high income producers 
produce products for high income consumers, such as Swiss precision 
watches or high performance luxury cars. Given the increasingly unequal 
distribution of income in many economies poor producers and poor 
consumers will not be confined to low income countries, and nor will high 
income consumers and producers be confined to high income economies. For 
example, the most rapidly-growing market for German luxury cars and French 
designer clothes is in China rather than in the high income northern 
economies. Analogously, there has been an explosion in the number of “thrift-
stores” in high income economies as unemployment deepens and as social 
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Figure 6: Innovation for poor-producers and innovation for poor 
consumers: Some examples  
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5. GOING BEYOND THE OBVIOUS: SECOND ROUND EFFECTS AND 
SYNERGIES BETWEEN BOP1 AND BOP2 PRODUCTION AND 
CONSUMPTION 
 
Poverty has a variety of dimensions. One key distinction is that between the 
relatively income-poor (a function of income distribution) and the absolutely-
income poor (a function of real consumption levels). However, income is only 
one element of poverty and concepts which embrace multidimensional 
poverty are increasingly penetrating the policy debate (Alkire and Santos, 
2010).  
 
In this paper we are largely focusing on the absolutely income-poor. This is 
reflected in the key MDG target on global poverty which is the percentage of 
the population living below $1.25pd in 2005 Purchasing Power Parity dollars. 
In 2008, they constituted 22.4% of the global population. However a second 
income category of the global poor is also often utilised, that is, those living 
above $1.25 per day, but below $2.50pd (20.6% of the global population in 
2008). We will refer to these two categories of the global poor as BOP1 
(”Bottom of the Pyramid”) and BOP2 respectively. Table 2 shows the 
distributional and global numbers of these two income groups in 1990 and 
2008. As in Table 1, China is a striking exception – the size of its BOP1 
population shrank remarkably over the 19 years, and the size of its BOP2 
population fell marginally, illustrating a process of large scale migration out of 
poverty of the mass of the poor population. South Asia suggests a stubbornly 
large number remaining in the BOP1 group, with little migration upwards of 
the BOP2 population into  BOP3 and beyond. SSA reflects growing poverty 
numbers in both BOP1 and BOP2 income groups.  
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 1990 2008 1990 2008 
China 683 173 278 222 
South Asia 617 571 342 554 
SSA 290 386 99 176 
World 1,909 1,289 955 1,182 
 
Source: Calculated from Chen and Ravallion, 2012 
Note: The variance between the numbers in Table 1 and this table with regard 
to  <$1.25 pd absolute poverty for India and South Asia arise from the fact 
that Table 1 contains data for India alone and this table is for South Asia . 
This non-correspondence of categories is a function of the availability of data 
in the primary sources. 
 
The distinction between these two groups of the globally poor has important 
implications for the inclusive innovation discussion. Critically the first group – 
often referred to as “The Bottom Billion” – represents a category of the global 
poor with minimal if any financial purchasing power. They live on, or below, 
the edge of subsistence with virtually no discretionary income beyond the 
barest minimum required to survive. By contrast, whilst those with incomes 
above $1.25pd but below $2.50pd characteristically suffer from various 
components of multidimensional poverty (undernourishment, low or no 
schooling, high morbidity, etc) (Sumner, 2010), they do tend to have some 
level of discretionary consumption power. The salient conclusions to be drawn 
from Table 2 is that of a global population of 5.75bn in 2008, 1.3bn were in the 
“no discretionary income” BOP1 group, and 1.2bn in the BOP2 group which 
has some measure of discretionary purchasing incomes.  
 
The business literature which sees the opportunity for the private sector to 
reap “the fortune at the bottom of the pyramid” (a strapline contributed by 
Prahalad) tends to make no distinction between these two groups of the 
global poor. They are often loosely lumped together and (drawing on Collier’s 
widely cited book, Collier 2007) referred to as “the Bottom Billion”.7   Yet, to 
the extent that inclusive pro-poor innovation will be driven by profit-oriented 
firms – whom Prahalad identified as the key innovation actors - it is more 
likely that the relevant global poor will be the BOP2 target group (and perhaps 
even more likely, a BOP3 category, those living above $2.50pd and below 
$4pd). 
 
                                            
7
  In fact, Collier’s widely cited text refers to countries with an average per capita 
income of less than $1.25pd, rather than those of the global population living below 
$1.25pd. As we noted above, Sumner calculates that more than 70% of those living 
below $1.25pd reside in middle income countries which are defined as those with a 
per capita income of more than $995 (in 2010 current prices), that is approximately 
$3 per day. 
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As we have seen, it is clear that in both SSA and India, and in many other low 
income economies, over the past two decades there has been little trickle 
down from the rich to the poor. This reflects a process of delinkage between 
the rich and the poor. But does this same pattern of delinkage exist between 
BOP1 and BOP2 populations, and if it does not, what does this have to say 
about the process and trajectory of inclusive innovation? 
 
We believe – but this is a largely untested hypothesis – that in most countries, 
the organic interaction within the poor, that is, between BOP1 and BOP2 
populations, is higher than that between the rich and the poor. Informed by 
earlier analysis of the observed interactions between the formal and informal 
sectors in the 1970s and 1980s we suggest that are a number of reasons why 
this might be the case. 
 
First, BOP1 provides cheap wage goods and services for BOP2 workers. This 
not only contributes to welfare in BOP2, but also keeps down wage rates and 
fosters growth in the economy at large. Moreover, because BOP2 populations 
are often involved in small-scale localised production in the immediate 
environment, this helps to promote localised production systems which 
encourage the emergence of BOP1 actors into the cash economy. Thus, 
BOP2 consumers with cash-incomes may be important consumers for 
emerging BOP1 producers. Second, BOP1 characteristically uses the detritus 
discarded by the BOP2 sector. Proximity to, and interaction with BOP2, thus 
fosters both production and consumption in the BOP1 population. Third, 
BOP2 income recipients characteristically provide transfers to BOP1 relatives. 
Fourth, there will be externalities in network-intensive public goods sectors 
such as energy, sanitation and telecoms where the costs of the network are 
covered by meeting the needs of BOP2 and the benefits spill-over to BOP1. 
Fifth, there is evidence that because BOP2 people live above the subsistence 
level, they are more open to adopting riskier and innovative entrepreneurial 
behaviour than are their BOP1 peers, providing important role models for 
those in the BOP1 category (Sonne, 2010).  
 
Consequently, for these (and other) reasons, innovation designed to meet the 
needs of the “second bottom billion” (BOP2) may have a variety of beneficial 
impacts on the absolutely poor (BOP1). We believe – although this is largely 
an unresearched area – that this linkage is distinctive and does not reflect the 
observed absence of trickle down from high income to low income groups in 
much of the world economy. From the perspective of policy therefore, meeting 
the needs of the very poorest may to some extent be met by meeting the 
needs of the not-very-poorest. But this is not to say that meeting the needs of 
the very poorest will be met by meeting the needs of the very richest (the de 
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6. THREE CONSTRAINTS TO INCLUSIVE INNOVATION 
 
Before we focus on potential drivers of inclusive innovation it is necessary to 
consider three constraints which affect their capacity to move this innovative 
agenda forward. These are the path dependency of the drivers, the constraint 
of scale and the problems of appropriation. None of these constraints are 
unique to inclusive innovation, but they do have a particularly important 
bearing on inclusive innovation. 
 
The constraint of innovation trajectories 
Drawing attention to the market potential of the new class of poor consumers 
Prahalad observed that there were four billion people living at per capita 
incomes below $2,000 p.a.. Crucially, and perhaps not surprisingly given that 
he worked in northern business schools, Prahalad believed that this provided 
a profitable market opportunity for transnational corporations (TNCs) rather 
than for the small-scale and locally-owned firms, NGOs and civil society 
organisations long identified in the appropriate technology and informal sector 
literature as being key providers for low income consumers. He argued that 
“[b]y stimulating commerce and development at the bottom of the economic 
pyramid, [northern-based] MNCs could radically improve the lives of billions of 
people… Achieving this goal does not require multinationals to spearhead 
global social development initiatives for charitable purposes. They need only 
act in their own self interest, for there are enormous business benefits to be 
gained by entering developing markets” (Prahalad and Hammond, 2002: 4). 
 
But the belief that northern TNCs would be able to grasp this market is an 
untested assertion. As Christenson’s widely-cited work has pointed out, large 
firms which dominate industries are often extremely good at hearing the 
demands of their existing customers, but very poor at hearing those of new 
customers. His argument is essentially that these weakness arise directly as a 
consequence of their core strengths, namely that they invested considerable 
resources in acutely understanding the needs of their core customers. Thus 
when a new technology arrives which fails to address these known needs 
effectively, the major innovating firms are dismissive. Christenson observed of 
firms like IBM’s who failed to take advantage of the market for PCs with little 
memory, the previously dominant industry leaders “…..were as well-run as 
one could expect a firm managed by mortals to be – but that there is 
something about the way decisions get made in successful organisations 
what sows the seeds of eventual failure”. They failed precisely because they 
listened to their existing customers so well – “the logical, competent decisions 
of management that are critical to the success of their companies are also 
why they lose their positions of leadership“(Christenson, 1997: xiii). What they 
patently failed to do was to understand a class of new customers (in IBM’s 
case, individual rather than corporate and military users). 
 
Northern-based TNCs suffer from another disadvantage in meeting the needs 
of the global poor. With their roots in high income markets where consumers 
often have large discretionary incomes, many northern firms are subject to 
considerable pressures from their customers to “gold plate” their production 
processes and to produce products which meet demanding health and safety 
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requirements. As a consequence their value chains are heavily standards 
intensive, and whilst some standards (such as those required to meet the 
needs of lean production) are cost saving, in general standards add pecuniary 
costs to value chains. Because of the very brand names which give these 
firms a competitive edge in their final markets amongst high income 
consumers, these northern TNCs are very vulnerable to the reputational 
damage which might sometimes arise from “frugal-engineered“ products and 
labour processes paying low wages, using child labour, denying rights of 
association to trades unions and involving environmental damage. Their 
southern based competitors  face few of these risks and may therefore be 
able to produce lower cost product accessible to poor consumers. 
 
It is thus an open question whether as a consequence of their innovation 
trajectories and the markets in which they operate, the leading northern-origin 
TNCs will be able to exploit this emerging low-income cash market effectively, 
By contrast, there are a variety of large scale domestic firms in low income 
economies which recognise the potential for profitability in targeting the needs 
of low income consumers, and addressing these needs through innovations 
which involve the use of labour-intensive technologies. A widely-cited 
example (which is not without its teething problems) is the Tata Nano in India. 
Using the principles of frugal engineering it produced a basic car priced at 
less than $2,500 and aimed at low income consumers moving up from a two-
wheeled scooter. This car would not have passed the stringent safety tests in 
Europe and North America or satisfy the different demands of high income 
consumers in those countries.  
 
The constraints on innovation imposed by path dependency is not of course 
limited to the private sector. It is common for many low income economies, 
particularly ex-colonies, to impose standards and regulations which area 
defined by high income economies and which are often wholly inappropriate 
to low income economy environments. These range from relatively minor 
product specifications to regulatory systems on issues such as intellectual 
property rights which circumscribe innovation in sectors which are of 
considerable importance such as pharma. Most urban hospitals in Africa for 
example use expensive and inappropriate “western” hospital beds.  They also 
apply to some of the charitable funds such as the Global Fund which impose 
standards which effectively exclude makes Indian and African suppliers.8  
 
The constraint of scale 
BOP1 and BOP2 markets are often characterised, at least in the early stage, 
by the small size of their markets. This makes them less attractive to profit-
seeking firms who are accustomed to working on a large scale. Another 
component of this scale constraint is the chicken-and-egg problem involved in 
the delivery of networked public goods such as sewerage, sanitation and 
telecoms. That is, that although once the network is developed, the costs of 
delivery are low, the high costs of production before critical network scale is 
reached inhibits the rolling out of the network. In these cases, the small size of 
the early market provides insufficient profit incentive to warrant market led 
                                            
8  www.open.ac.uk/ikd/projects/industrial-productivity-health-sector-performance/ 
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investments in the innovation cycle (that is, from conception, through 
production and marketing as characterised in Figure 1 above). The same 
process can be observed in the development of some pro-poor products such 
as anti-retrovirals and malaria-vaccines. Their development involves an 
inherently knowledge-intensive process with a long gestation period. Whilst 
when fully developed and produced in large volumes, these products may 
provide the opportunity for profitable production, there is a chicken-and-egg 
problem in overcoming the scale hurdle. It is not surprising therefore that the 
large pharma TNCs have often neglected a series of diseases which 
disproportionately affect the global poor, such as malaria (Kale et al, 2013; 
Moran et al, 2005) 
 
The constraint of appropriation: Public goods for the poor 
The third constraint to the innovation of pro-poor products arises in relation to 
the development and delivery of public goods. These public goods are 
characterised by two intrinsic factors which inhibit market led innovation 
actors. On the one hand, they are difficult to appropriate, and on the other 
hand, they are not used up in consumption. Classic examples of public goods 
are to be found in the health and sanitation sectors. In fact few products are 
“pure” public goods, that is that they are inherently inappropriable or non-
rivalrous; they are merely difficult to appropriate and or to exclude consumers. 
In these cases it is unlikely that  profit-seeking private actors will emerge to 
meet the needs of the global poor. Either governments will need to step in to 
fill the gap left by this particular form of market failure or new and innovative 
alliances of actors will have to emerge. 
 
 
7. INNOVATION ACTORS: WHO DRIVES THE DEVELOPMENT AND 
DIFFUSION OF INCLUSIVE INNOVATION? 
 
Returning to the earlier discussion on the origins of the growing interest in 
inclusive innovation (Section 2), and informed by our reflections on the 
complexity of the innovation cycle (Section 3), the role played by the poor as 
producers and consumers (Section 4), the interactions between BOP1 and 
BOP2 populations (Section 5) and the constraints to inclusive innovation 
(Section 6), we can identify three key sets of actors involved in the 
development, promotion and diffusion of inclusive innovation. 
 
The Schumpeterian motor drives the private sector 
The “new kid on the block” in this unfolding story is the growing role played by 
the private sector in inclusive innovation. Until the mid-1990s the primary 
inclusive innovation actors were not-for-profit NGOs and community based 
organisations working outside of the market, driven by what might be termed 
a Schumacherian-motor. By contrast, over the past two decades inclusive 
innovation has increasingly become a primary objective for the profit-seeking 
private sector, driven by a Schumpeterian-motor. Here we can distinguish 
three major types of private sector actors. 
 
The first set comprises the very large firms, be they northern-based TNCs 
such as Unilever, General Electric and Philips, or southern origin large firms 
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such as Tata and Godrej from India, Haier and Lenovo in China and MTN in 
South Africa. These innovators seek to gain rapid scale in multiple markets, 
and although we have argued that the northern-based TNCs might find it 
more difficult to penetrate low income markets than their southern-based 
rivals, these northern and southern firms have much in common. In particular, 
their objective is to massify production and globalise sales of their inclusive 
innovations. 
 
The second group of private sector actors are medium sized firms. In 
southern economies, they are not only targeting their own low income 
populations but are increasingly seeking to move out of their local markets, 
often as a result of intense competition in their domestic markets (a primary 
driver of Chinese private sector involvement in Africa – Kaplinsky and Morris, 
2009; Shen, 2013). In northern economies, medium sized firms with a 
domestic or regional presence (for example, European firms selling into the 
EU) not only recognise the dynamism of low and middle income markets, but 
are also confronted by slow growth or stagnation in their established markets. 
Unlike the very large firms which have considerable experience in global 
markets, these medium sized firms are confronted by significant knowledge 
gaps in penetrating low income markets, or in markets in countries which are 
foreign to their past operations. 
 
Finally, there are the small firms operating in very local markets. 
Characteristically they are engaged in minor, incremental innovations with a 
weak science base. But often, because of their origins, their innovations are 
particularly appropriate for low income consumers or for particular distinctive 
operating environments. Even more than in the case of medium sized firms, 
there may be major market failures in the commercialisation of their 
innovations with missed opportunities to promote the welfare of poor 
producers and consumers outside of their immediate locale. 
 
Not-for-profit drivers of inclusive innovation 
As observed, historically, not-for-profit actors have been the primary drivers of 
inclusive innovation. They remain a considerable source of inclusive 
innovation today, even though much of this occurs “below the radar” and does 
not surface in many of the measures used to measure innovation such as 
patents, R&D, sales and trade. One set of these innovators are community 
based organisations working at grassroots levels in both southern economies 
(for example, the Honeybee network in India 
(http://www.sristi.org/cms/en/our_network) and northern economies. 
Particularly in the south, they build on deep local knowledge  and informal 
knowledge systems (Smith, Fressoli and Thomas, 2013; www.steps-
centre.org).  
 
The diffusion of the inclusive innovations developed by these community 
based organisations is aided by the operations of formal sector NGOs and 
those operating at a global scale. Often these NGOs are focused in particular 
areas, such as those targeting renewable energy and other technologies 
responding to the threats posed by climate change. But others, such as 
Practical Action (www.practicalaction.org) have a much broader remit and are 
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increasingly focused on the disembodied technologies of delivery and value 
chain coordination as well as focusing on embodied products. 
 
More recently, we have witnessed the emergence of very large not-for-profit 
funds such as the Gates Foundation and GAVI. They have predominantly 
focussed on public goods, and unlike the large and medium scale private 
sector which has generally targeted innovations at BOP2 populations, these 
large Funds have focused on inclusive innovations which are of primary and 
direct importance to BOP1 populations with  very little purchasing power. A 
core component of these types of not-for-profit innovators – particularly in the 
health sector - is their involvement with governments and the large scale 
private sector in the form of public-private-partnerships. 
 
Governments and the aid sector as drivers of inclusive innovation 
Governments have become increasingly aware of both the need for, and 
opportunities opened up by inclusive innovation. This applies to governments 
in the south and governments in the north. Although the range of these 
interventions is largely uncatalogued, casual empiricism suggests that these 
interventions are gathering pace, including through support provided for 
National Systems of Innovation and the provision of funding to enhance the 
diffusion of inclusive innovations. The aid community has also taken up the 
challenge. A notable example is the UK’s Department for International 
Development which places considerable emphasis on inclusivity in its aid 
agenda, albeit with a weak focus on inclusive innovation. Both the World Bank 
and UNDP are also increasingly emphasising the role which innovation can 





In summary, the uncoupling of growth from development has been a primary 
growth trajectory in virtually all of the global economy over the past two 
decades, north and south. Despite the rapid growth of output in the south, 
outside of China, the numbers living in absolute poverty have remained 
stubbornly large; in Africa they have increased substantially. Although the 
trajectory of innovation – using increasingly capital intensive, large scale and 
environmentally damaging technologies to produce goods and services for 
rich consumers – is only part of this unfolding story, it has a primary role to 
play in reorienting economic growth in more developmentally satisfactory 
ways. A key development has been the growth of technological capabilities in 
the south, and allied to the rapid growth of low and middle income consumer 
markets in these economies, we have begun to witness a major transition in 
the market orientation of profit-seeking investment and innovation. An 
increasing number of private sector actors are targeting inclusive innovation 
as sources of sales and profit. Allied to this, large scale Development Funds 
and governments and aid agencies have also begun to direct resources to 
promote inclusive innovation. and sales. 
 
These are all positive developments, although achieving more 
developmentally satisfactory outcomes requires considerably more than 
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inclusive innovation. But despite this positive innovation trajectory, there is 
considerable scope for enhancing the pace and direction of inclusive 
innovation. Each of the key sets of innovation actors has a limited set of 
objectives, with a disproportionate focus on BOP2 cash-markets and products 
developed for individualised consumption. Amongst those actors who have a 
broader concern with both the market- and non-market driven diffusion of 
inclusive innovation, there is a weak if not non-existent grasp of the different 
elements of inclusive innovation, a weakness in introducing joined-up 
synergistic policies an associated weakness in identifying the “low hanging 
fruit”, in developing an appropriate and supportive national system of 
innovation and in directing scarce innovative resources in the most cost-
effective way. We believe that the analysis undertaken in this paper will help 
to clear the muddy waters which have led to the suboptimal development and 
diffusion of inclusive innovation. 
 
A stronger evidence base is required for private and public actors to promote 
inclusive innovation effectively. As we noted above, at least by comparison of 
their understanding of markets in high income economies, there is a 
deficiency in relevant private sector knowledge bases on low income markets. 
The gap for public sector actors is even larger, and there is clearly an 
important role for the research community to play in evidencing the extent, the 
nature, the inducements to and the obstacles to the development and 
deployment of inclusive innovation. 
 
Finally, although all of the examples in this paper have referred to the 
challenges posed in low income southern environments, there has been a 
process of growing exclusion in the high income northern economies as well. 
We believe that the architecture which we have presented above applies as 
much to these high income economies as it does to low income economies, 
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